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CRITICAL BORDERLANDS & INTERDISCIPLINARY,
INTERSECIONAL COALITIONS

K.L. BROAD*

In this piece, I am exploring what it means to participate as an activist scholar in a "politics of difference." In so doing, I am reading LatCrit
as an intellectual legal "movement" enacting a "politics of difference" by
embodying ideals of difference, intersectionality, interdisciplinarity, and
coalition.' I participate in this "politics of difference" by asking how social science and legal scholarship might produce postmodern, partial, and
critical knowledges through interdisciplinary efforts in two ways. First, I
take an intradisciplinary focus to examine the link between identity politics and constructions of situated sociological knowledges, suggesting
means by which to continue creating critical knowledges in a politics of
difference. Second, I take an interdisciplinary approach by writing as a
sociologist to a LatCrit audience, offering one model by which we might
conceive of disciplinary crossing in the production of critical theory. In
other words, in this work, I am assuming that we are all players in a politics of difference, albeit differently situated actors, acting and creating
knowledges from multiple and varying standpoints. My interest in this
piece is to address how we might work in coalition across our situated
standpoints and disciplinary knowledges.

*

Please direct any correspondence to K.L. Broad, PO Box 117330, Department of

Sociology, Center for Women's Studies and Gender Research, Univeristy of Florida, Gainesville,
Florida 32611-7330, kendal@soc.ufl.edu. I want to begin this work by thanking Berta Esperanza
Heminndez-Truyol and Francisco Valdes who assured me that a feminist sociologist had a place in
LatCrit and encouraged me to stretch my definitions of Sociology and Women's Studies by stepping
into LatCrit interdisciplinarity. I would also like to thank LatCrit V participants who helped me to
better understand LatCrit while also helping me to better translate my work into LatCrit terminology.
Finally, I would like to acknowledge Patricia Hill Collins whose work has greatly influenced my
thinking.
1. See generally Sumi K. Cho, Multiplicities and lntersectionalities: Exploring LatCrit
Diversities: Essential Politics, 2 HARV. L. REV. 433 (1997); Berta Esperanza Hemrnndez-Truyol,
The Gender Bend: Culture, Sex, and Sexuality - A LatCritical Human Rights Map of Latina/o
Border Crossings (2000) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author); Elizabeth M. Iglesias &
Francisco Valdes, Religion Gender,Sexuality, Race and Class in CoalitionalTheory: A Criticaland
Self-Critical Analysis of LatCrit Social Justice Agendas, 19 CHICANO-LATINO L. REV. 503 (1998);
Francisco Valdes, Latinalo Ethnicities, Critical Race Theory, and Post-Identity Politics in
Postmodern Legal Culture: From Practices to Possibilities,9 LA RAZA LJ. 1 (1996); Francisco
Valdes, Under Construction: LatCrit Consciousness, Community, and Theory, 85 CAL L. REV.
1087 (1997); Francisco Valdes, Afterword, Theorizing "OutCrit" Theories: CoalitionalMethod and
ComparativeJurisprudentialExperience- RaceCrits, QueerCritsand LatCrits,53 U. MIAMI L. REV
1265 (1999).
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Specifically, this work is asking how we (as activist knowledge producers) can make the move from "identity politics" to a "postpostmodern politics of difference and identification. 2 I answer this question from my own lens of social science by examining the challenges to
sociological understandings of the feminization of poverty presented, and
possibly resolved, by post-modernism. The first part of this piece illustrates how sociological and activist knowledges (feminist and transgender) about the "feminization" of poverty are each situated standpoints
sometimes acting as dominant discourses.' The second part of this essay
argues that it remains important for us to create situated knowledges
from our outsider standpoints, but to do so without reproducing hegemonic discourse, we must work (politically) in coalition and (epistemologically) create interdisciplinary borderlands. Building off theories of
postmodern politics, 4 I assert that we must construct coalitions through
"migration" into strategically intersectional "outsider within" positions.
I. "FEMINIZATIONS" OF POVERTY

I begin with some questions. Why do we not speak of transgender
people of color or queer Latina/os when we address the "feminization of
poverty?" How is it that the "feminization of poverty" has become un-

2. See generally Valdes, Latinao Ethnicities,supra note 1.
3. This is similar to the way in which Critical Race Theory has been described as
androcentric, Afrocentric, and heterocentric. Valdes, Latinafo Ethnicities, supra note 1, at 5. My
examination of situated standpoints in sociological knowledge is in many ways illustrating a similar
point made by LatCrits about the essentialist dangers of other critical legal endeavors.
4. See generally PATRICIA HILL COLLINS, FIGHTING WORDS: BLACK WOMEN AND THE
SEARCH FOR JUSTICE (1998); SHANE PHELAN, GEnNG SPECIFIC: POSTMODERN LESBIAN POLInCS
(1994); STEVEN SEIDMAN, DIFFERENCE TROUBLES: QUEERING SOCIAL THEORY AND SEXUAL
POLITICS (1997).

5. See generally COLINS, supra note 4. In the spirit of doing interdisciplinary work, this
piece uses the language of sociology, social movement theory, feminist theory, queer theory, and
transgender activism. During my presentation of this work, Professor Athena Mutua acted as
commentator and relayed to me that she had to translate much of what I was saying into critical legal
studies and LatCrit language. As I understand, my discussion of the tension between a politics of
identity and difference is similar to LatCrit discussions of "politics of differentiation and
identification." See generally Valdes, Latina/o Ethnicities, supra note 1. My interest in partial
knowledges and situated standpoints is parallel to "perspective jurisprudence" and "outsider
jurisprudence." See generally MARTHA ALBERTSON FINEMAN, THE NEUTERED MOTHER, THE
SEXUAL FAMILY AND OTHER TWENTIETH CENTURY TRAGEDIES (1995); Mari J. Matsuda, Legal
Storytelling: Public Response to Racist Speech: Considering the Victim's Story, 87 MICH. L. REV.
2320 (1989). My use of "outsider within" and "intersectional" ideas are similar to notions of
"multi-dimensionality" and "intersectionality." See generally Berta Esperanza Hemdndez-Truyol,
Building Bridges - Latinas and Latinos at the Crossroads: Realities, Rhetoric and Replacement,
25 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 369 (1994); Kimberld Crenshaw, Mapping the Margins:
Intersectionality,Identity Politics, and Violence Against Women of Color, 43 STAN. L. REV. 1241
(1991). My use of "coalition" is similar to the use of the same term in LatCrit work. See generally
Iglesias & Valdes, supra note 1. The interesting process for me in this work has been to step into the

act of "doing coalition" by presenting this work and finding out "what we shared."
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derstood as an example of "female" subordination curiously distinct from
racialized and sexualized subordination? How might we attend to these
subjugated knowledges from our own locations within a matrix of domination? Specifically, how can I, a white, non-Latina/o, middle class,
U.S.-bom-and-raised, and gender bending dyke participate in dialogue
about the racialized feminization of poverty in the U.S.? In other words,
how can a white dyke living in a rabidly heteronormative culture speak
to a phenomenon defined in terms of the presumed "failure" of modem
day heterosexuality for people of color (replete with white supremacist,
capitalist, patriarchal stereotypes of single motherhood, welfare babies,
and attendant ravages of poverty)? And, how do I speak about the poverty faced by many "women" (and I mean that in the broadest sense of
the term) of color, knowing that my "outness" and gender bending are, in
many ways, symbolic of my race/class privilege? Are we not speaking
across differently-lived specificities of oppression? I am asking how we
participate in anti-subordination efforts across our multiple intersections.
I am interested in asking questions about how we can participate in
a politics of difference--cognizant of intersectionality, multiplicity, and
interconnectedness-while also carrying those aspects of "identity politics" that still resonate within our selves, communities, and lives. Importantly, single-identity political processes are now understood as perpetuating, in fact reifying, elitism and marginality. For example, the works of
U.S. feminists of color highlight the limits of a politics based on one
identity and call for a politics of difference by challenging mainstream,
white, middle class feminism that erases race and class and by challenging ethnic nationalism that erases gendered experiences of racism. Yet,
because "the American political environment makes a stable collective
identity both necessary and damaging," the "era" of identity politics is
not exactly over.6
I begin this inquiry with the recognition that a politics of identity-whereby collective political and cultural identities are constructed
through political struggle and commitment-is still viable and necessary
in sociopolitical and cultural models of ethnic identity and interest-group
politics. Why else would the "Lat" be a part of "LatCrit"? In my opinion, the task has become one of defining and enacting a politics of difference, clarifying the distinctions from a politics of identity. Another way
to think of it is as striving to do a better "identity politics," which "does
not mean finding the best definition of our identities so as to eliminate
problems of membership and goals; it means continual shuffling between

6. Joshua Gamson, Must Identity Movements Self-destruct? A Queer Dilemma, in SOCIAL
PERSPECTIVES IN LESBIAN AND GAY STUDIES 589, 599 (Peter M. Nardi & Beth E. Schneider eds.,
1996).
7. STEVEN BEST & DOUGLAS KELLNER, POSTMODERN THEORY: CRMCAL INTERROGATIONS
205 (1991); Gamson, supra note 6, 595.
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the need for categories and the recognition of their incompleteness."' In
many ways, I read the work of LatCrit as engaging the complicated move
from identity politics to a politics of difference. As such, I see this work
engaging the move from identity to difference by exploring the means by
which two movements based on differences of identity/oppression
(Feminist movement(s) and the Transgender movement) can work in
coalition to address a manifestation of multiple oppressions-namely the
"feminization" of poverty. Simply stated, my questions at the beginning
of this work were asking how we can do coalition/alliance work, especially how we can work in coalition across our multiple intersections and
concrete experiences of oppression.
In so doing, I am also asking these questions to highlight the epistemological conundrums we face in post-modernity--puzzles of subjectivity, knowledge and politics. Postmodern theories raise questions of
universalism, essentialism, foundationalism and dichotomous thinking
that are helpful to anti-subordination efforts and critical theorizing. 9 As I
understand it, LatCrit embraces postmodern concerns through four emphases: 1) production of partial, specific, and subjugated knowledges; 2)
construction of transformative knowledge applicable to concrete social
change; 3) anti-essentialist/intersectional
ideals; and 4) coalitional/community organizing. 0 While LatCrit is a movement based in
critical legal theory, it is my understanding that it is also a movement
striving toward an interdisciplinary focus. In that spirit, this work takes a
critical sociology perspective to address similar theoretical and political
questions. In recognition of the epistemological limits of objectivity, I
begin this work with personal questions because they serve to contextualize my place within the work, marking my situated standpoint. Because
this work is exploring how we work together from our multiple marginalities, as outsiders-differently situated-within, my questions at the
beginning were raising the general question of this piece: how we can
speak from situated standpoints in coalitional/allied anti-subordination
efforts."
I focus on the feminization of poverty because it represents a matrix
of domination that has been both erased and silenced by dominant discourse and also inadequately addressed by identity-based politics. There
are other issues that are similarly situated, but I engage this issue because
it is one that has been characterized (by law, social science and media) so
centrally as the fault of heterosexual, poor women of color while simultaneously portrayed as separate from the everyday experiences of transgender individuals. To me, an issue assumed to be the purview of one
8.
9.
10.
11.

PHELAN, supra note 4, at 154
BEST & KEL.NER, , supra note 7, at 207.
See generally Hernindez-Truyol, supra note 1.
COi.INS, supranote 4, at 5.
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group but not another seems the ideal challenge for two movements concerned with the intersections of race/class/gender/sexual identities and
oppressions, yet situated quite differently. If the feminization of poverty
is a "natural" issue for feminists but not for the transgender movement,
the question of how theoretical/political ideas from the transgender
movement can be applied to an analysis of the issue becomes quite engaging. In my mind, it makes the challenge of talking about intersectional coalitions/alliances quite salient.
I speak here as a non-Latino/a white academic feminist gender
bending dyke who has spent a great deal of time striving to sociologically understand social movement processes and, specifically, the ways
in which transgender activists manage, negotiate, plan, and succeed in
border crossings.' In this piece, I begin exploring how gender-based
movements (feminist and transgender movements) can work/theorize in
coalition/alliance. In particular, I focus my discussion on feminist and
transgender/queer activism, movements that theorize/act from differently
situated outsider-within locations that "produce distinctive oppositional
knowledges that embrace multiplicity yet remain cognizant of power."' 3 I
begin by discussing our current knowledge about the "feminization of
poverty," illustrating the way that it has been constructed by sociological
knowledge as an issue about poor women, with little recognition of the
sexual and gendered components of "feminization." I suggest that a critical race feminist understanding of the "feminization of poverty" racializes our understanding of the issue, but still does not address the multiple
ways in which we might see a "feminization" of poverty in terms of gender/sexuality. Assuming that the theory/activism relationship does not
have to be one dimensional (producing theory to lead activism), I next
look to transgender activism to inform our theoretical understanding of
how we might expand the domain of "feminization." In particular, I identify the way that one part of the transgender movement has sought to
problematize the stability of gender categories through legal resistance,
albeit without specific focus on race and class. Concluding that both
feminist and transgender standpoints fall short of addressing an expanded
domain of the "feminization" of poverty, the final section explores the
means by which coalitions/alliances can be forged across situated standpoints. In the end, I suggest that borderland coalitions/alliances are
needed to address the feminization of poverty and other issues that serve
to construct boundaries, borders, and subordination.

12. In this paper, I would like to step away from my usual role of sociologist observing/
participating/understanding "others" and speak, in many ways, as an activist. In fact, I do not even
like creating that false dichotomy between social scientist and activist, but I suggest it here because I
want to highlight my own participation in the acts of resistance to which I will refer. As well, I want
to be clear that these are my own ideas of how to move forward in anti-subordination efforts - and
not those of the activists with whom I've interacted and learned.
13. COLLINS, supra note 4, at 8.
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II. FEMINISMS: SITUATED "FEMINIZATIONS" OF POVERTY

In an academic sense, I tend to see the "feminization of poverty"
from the lens of a white feminist sociologist. As such, I understand that
the rates of poverty for women and children in the U.S. increased significantly in the last four decades, often as a result of the increasing number
of female-headed households. I understand that the concept "feminization of poverty" was introduced by sociologist Diane Pearce in her 1978
article, The Feminization of Poverty: Women, Work, and Welfare, where
she argued that the combination of public welfare and sex-segregation in
the workplace institutionalized sexism and fostered poverty among
women.' 4 Simply stated, sociological knowledge identified an increased
rate of women in poverty, explained it as a shift from sex-neutral poverty
to gender-specific poverty, and theorized how changes in family structure, women's place in the workforce, and the nature of public services
for women and children contributed to an increased proportion of women
and children in poverty. 5 If I stop here, it would seem that sociological
knowledge etches an image of poverty rates simply characterized by
gender in the U.S.
It is important to note that research about the feminization of poverty also emerged from research about race, class and family-a great
deal of which was done in response to the Moynihan report of 1965,
which characterized the dissolution of the black family (with high rates
of female-headed households) as pathologically responsible for poverty. 16
Consequently, sociological research in the 1980s and 1990s highlighted
the intersection of race and class in the feminization of poverty." Importantly, this research problematized the assumed primacy of gender in the
term "feminization of poverty," suggesting it was not primarily gender
that characterizes poverty for women of color but very real subordination
based on race and class. It is from research grounded in such critical race
theory that we saw how the feminization of poverty was never a new
phenomenon plaguing all "women" but was actually yet another
manifestation of a long established matrix of domination in the U.S. In
fact, some scholars argue against using the very term "feminization of
poverty" because it brings gender to the fore, such that dynamics of
racism, classism, and poverty are erased.8 So, as a feminist sociologist, I
14.

See generally Diane Pearce, The Feminization of Poverty: Women, Work and Welfare,

11(1) URB. & SOC. CHANGE REV. 28 (1978).
15. RENEE FEINBERG & KATHLEEN E. KNOX, THE FEMINIZATION OF POVERTY IN THE UNITED

STATES, 21 (1990).
16.

DANIEL P. MOYNIHAN, THE NEGRO FAMILY: THE CASE FOR NATIONAL ACTION (1965).

17.

See generally TERESA AMOTr & JULIE MATrHAEI, RACE, GENDER, AND WORK: A

MULTICULTURAL ECONOMIC HISTORY OF WOMEN IN THE UNITED STATES (1996); Race, Class and

the Feminization of Poverty, 3 SOCIALIST POLITICS 5 (1985); Rose M. Brewer, Black Women in
Poverty: Some Comments on Female-headed Families, 13 SIGNS 331 (1988); Linda Burnham, Has
Poverty Been Feminized in Black America?, 26 BLACK SCHOLAR 14 (1985); Pearce, supra note 14.
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classism, and poverty are erased. 8 So, as a feminist sociologist, I am left
with a complicated body of knowledge that identifies increased rates of
poverty among women and children, and especially women and children
of color, due to intersecting dynamics of racism, classism, and sexism.
Yet, as a feminist sociologist, I also think it is important to an understanding of the feminization of poverty to examine how sociology (or
social science more generally) is also complicit in reproducing and reifying a matrix of domination. U.S. feminist sociologists of color have
warned of the dangers of objectivity, universalism, and subject/object
dichotomies in the project of a positivist sociology.' 9 For example, we
know that sociologies of family have served to reify the image of a nucreating as deviant
clear family with 2.5 children as "normal," ••thereby
20
single-parent households and extended families. More generally, we see
that social science knowledge must be examined as a dominant discourse. As Charles Lemert states:
It has long been recognized that professional sociologists have resisted
a serious taking into account of feminism. If anything, their record
has been even more dismal in their unwillingness to read with definitive seriousness the writings of other extramural sociologists---the
new developments in queer theory and postcolonial studies, the varied
and serious work by African Americanists, the very considerable literature by and about Black feminists and other women of color.
Thus, I approach the issue of feminization of poverty, as a feminist sociologist with the following question: if sociology is understood as a
dominant discourse, what "knowledge" do we actually have about the
feminization of poverty?
Today, we know that while the overall rate of poverty in the U.S. is
decreasing, the rates of women and female-headed families in poverty
have been increasing--men and their families are the ones escaping poverty, while women and their children increasingly experience it. Furthermore, we know that Chicano/as and Latina/os experience more poverty overall than do whites, and among Latina/os and Chicanos/as, the
women are disproportionately poor. Currently, the dynamics of racism,
sexism, and poverty are still quite similar for Latina/os. For example, a

18. See generally FEINBERG & KNOX, supra note 15; Burnham, supra note 17; Martha E.
Gimenez, The Feminizationof Poverty: Myth or Reality?, 19 INT'LJ. HEALTH SERVICES 45 (1989).
19. PATRICIA HILL COLLINS, BLACK FEMINIST THOUGHT: KNOWLEDGE, CONSCIOUSNESS,
AND THE POLITICS OF EMPOWERMENr (2000); COLLINS, supra note 4: Maxine Baca Zinn, Family,
Feminism, and Race in America, 4 GENDER & SOC. 68 (1990).
20. See generally Zinn, supra note 19.
21.

CHARLES LEMERT, SOCIOLOGY AFrER THE CRISIS 207 (1995).
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recent Los Angeles Times article reported that median household assets
for Latina/os has declined."
Needless to say, this "data" suggests that with regard to racism/classism/sexism, "the more things change, the more they stay the
same." ' The subordination of women of color in the U.S. capitalist labor
market is well established, such that there is a clear historical legacy to
the "feminization of poverty." 2 4 Yet, we must ask whether this construction of "feminization of poverty" is always critical social theory. Patricia
Hill Collins notes that "[b]lack feminist thought remains emancipatory in
some dimensions, namely, conceptualizing power relations through intersections of race, gender, and class, yet dominant in others, namely, its
relative silence on issues of sexual politics and on nationalism." In other
words, a construction of the feminization of poverty that only focuses on
the intersection of race/class/gender is, itself, a partial knowledge derived
from a situated standpoint.
I am suggesting that critical race theory, feminism, and indeed critical race feminism, are not bound by exclusionary identity politics, yet
they are situated standpoints that construct dominant knowledges in regards to gender and sexuality. Specifically, the sociological lens by
which we view the feminization of poverty is characterized both by
white, middle class feminism (emphasizing the salience of gender and
women's subordination) and critical race feminism(s) (emphasizing the
intersections of race/class/gender and the subordination of poor women
of color). What we do not see is an expanded view of the way poverty is
"feminized."
Where are the lesbians of color within these discussions? If we
queer our lens, does the phrase "single women with children" have different meaning? Isn't our understanding of the "feminization of poverty"
dependent on assumptions of heteronormativity that erase bisexual and
lesbian women of color? This question is very important, given the centrality of theorizing by U.S. lesbians of color in feminist theories and
critical race feminisms2 and the curious way that they are often characterized as simply "U.S. feminists of color" and their critiques of heteronormativity erased. Additionally, where are Male-to-Female transgender
individuals in these constructions of "feminized" poverty? Does the matrix of race/class/gender domination explain their daily negotiation of the

22.
Mar. 25,
23.
24.
25.
26.

Mary Williams Walsh, Latinos' Net Worth Shrinking Despite Boom Times, L.A. TIMES,
2000, at A16.
COLLINS, supra note 4, at 13.
See generally AMOTT & MATrHAEI, supra note 17.
COLLINS, supra note 4, at 89.
See generally GLORIA ANZALDIJA, BORDERLANDS: LA FRONTERA (1995); AUDRE LORDE,

SISTER OUTSIDER: ESSAYS AND SPEECHES (1984); CHERRJE MORAGA, LOVING IN THE WAR YEARS

(1983).
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maze of poverty due to their transgression of gender? Does sociological
knowledge about rates of poverty for women and children highlight issues of sexism within a heterosexual paradigm such that the experience
of effeminate gay men is subjugated?
When sociological and anthropological literature on Latino sexuality "suggests that Latino men's sexual identity is determined not by the
biological sex of the sexual partner but rather by the culturally defined
roles of activo/pasivo (i.e. dominant/submissive) assumed by the actors,"
also describe those considered femimight "feminization"
nine/submissive/pasivo rather than simply essentialized categories of
women and men? 27 In other words, why do we not see the faces of young
gay men of color, Latino youth, "feminized" as "pasivo" and often ostracized from family, community and support networks? Are these youth
represented in the high numbers of "children in poverty?" Does a theory
that depends on the assumption that women face increased levels of poverty as compared to men not serve to erase those whose lived experience
challenges the essentialist categories of "woman" and "man?" Will understanding the matrix of racism/classism/sexism explain the intersection
of gender and sexual domination that marks the lives of gay, lesbian,
bisexual, transgender, and queer people?
At heart, I am arguing that all of these examples suggest our
understandings of poverty and its "feminization" are only partial
knowledges. Importantly, the absence of knowledges about the
"feminization" of poverty for gay, lesbian, bisexual, and transgender
individuals indicates not only a silencing of certain knowledges, but also
a constructing of dominant knowledges about sexuality and gender.
Clearly, a conceptualization of the "feminization of poverty" that
assumes there has been a marked increase of women (of color) and children into poverty due to dissolution of heterosexual marriage does not
recognize, let alone explain, the above-mentioned gendered/sexualized
experiences. In other words, the construction of knowledges about "feminization of poverty" depends on dual and intersecting assumptions of
heteronormativity and binary gender. I suggest that these constructions of
knowledge are representative of situated standpoints of white feminists
and feminists of color. As such, it seems logical to presume that we can
create new knowledges that do not essentialize gender and presume heteronormativity. In the next section, I discuss whether a queer/transgender
perspective of poverty (conceptulaized in terms of the various forms of
transgender activism) might expand the domain of this social problem,
such that we might avoid erasing lives and creating discourses of dominance in the very project of constructing critical knowledges.

27. See generally Lionel Canti, Entre Hombres/Between Men: Latino Masculinities and
Homosexualities, in GAY MASCULINITIES 224 (Peter M. Nardi ed., 2000).
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III. TRANGENDERING A "FEMINIZATION OF POVERTY"?
The history of gender transgression and gender transition is one that
has been silenced, erased, and co-opted, according to transgender activists)2 As is often the case with a group whose lives have been defined

and pathologized by others, the word "transgender" was first coined to
name an experience that was not captured by available terms. Moving
beyond a coded language of "speaking without saying,"9 Virginia Prince
coined the term "transgenderist" in 1987 to name the experience of people who had changed their gender, but not their sex.3° Simply explained,
Prince was naming the experience of being born a "biological male,"
dressing as a woman, living as a woman full time, but not opting for sexreassignment surgery. 3 In the 1990s the term transgender (or TG)
emerged as a contested term among various groups within a broader gender-bending community: transvestites, transsexuals, cross-dressers,
transgenderists, gender blenders, gender benders, drag queens, bigenders,
feminine men, androgynes, drag kings, intersexuals, masculine women,
cross-genders, butch lesbians, shape shifters, passing women, bearded
women, passing men, gender dysphorics and others who might consider
themselves "gender outlaws."32
In general, the emerging transgender movement in the 1990s sought
organized resistance to medical, legal, and social restrictions of a Western, binary gender system. As MacKenzie explains, "transsexualism is
moving away from being considered a psychological "disorder" that is
treatable with surgery and hormones to a grassroots civil rights movement."33 Importantly, Feinberg explains that the process by which transgender individuals jettison medical labels to organize together for the
right to live unrestrained by binary gender norms is complex and characterized by a variety of experiences.34 The "movement" is characterized by
hundreds of organizations nationwide, a complex system of support

28.

See generally KATE BORNSTEIN, GENDER OUTLAW: ON MEN, WOMEN, AND THE REST OF

US (1994); PAT CALFIA, SEX CHANGES: THE POLITICS OF TRANSGENDERISM (1997); LESLIE
FEINBERG, TRANSGENDER WARRIORS: MAKING HISTORY FROM JOAN OF ARC TO RUPAUL (1996);
RIKI ANNE WILCHNS, READ MY LIPS: SEXUAL SUBVERSION AND THE END OF GENDER (1997).
29. See generally Jason Cromwell, Talking About Without Talking About: The Use of
ProtectiveLanguage Among Transvestites and Transsexuals, in BEYOND THE LAVENDER LEXICON:
AUTHENTIICTY, IMAGINATION, AND APPROPRIATION IN LESBIAN AND GAY LANGUAGES 267
(William L. Leap ed., 1995).
30. See generally FEINBERG, supranote 28.
31. Many in the transsexual community have heavily critiqued Virginia Prince's work and
public statements about transsexual experience because Prince is not a transsexual and often
dismisses the validity of transsexual experience.
32. See generally BLENDING GENDERS: SOCIAL ASPECTS OF CROSS-DRESSING AND SEXCHANGING (Richard Ekins & Dave King eds., 1996); BORNSTEIN, supra note 28; FEINBERG, supra
note 28.
33. See generally GORDENE OLGA MACKENZIE, TRANSGENDER NATION (1994).
34. See generallyFEINBERG, supra note 28.
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groups, local and national conferences, active internet newsgroups, publications, listserves, web sites,35 and a range of grassroots efforts-from
direct action to more "traditional" efforts to lobby legislators in Washington D.C., 6 academics creating new knowledges, activists challenging the knowledges currently being produced,38 and a growing collective
of people who resist the idea that gender is stable and unchangeable.
My ethnographic research on transgender activism focused on the
means by which transgender activists employed processes of identity and
differences as they struggled to act collectively despite a variety of experiences and identities. My research illustrated that a key aspect of
transgender activism in the U.S. during the 1990s was the process of
constructing a collective "transgender" identity through the creation of
transgender group boundaries, articulation of transgender consciousness,
and negotiation of transgender identity in everyday life. The construction
of a "transgender" collective identity suggests a "transgender" standpoint, whereby those with lived experience and the political achievement
of a critical consciousness possess a particular knowledge of the binary
gender system. In particular, the transgender standpoint centers on understanding "transgender oppression" and envisioning "transgender
rights," offering a very particular understanding of domination and subordination
Rather than understanding the "feminization of poverty" in terms of
the interlocking axes of race/class/gender domination, a transgender
standpoint might examine the dominant gender categorization system
that assumes stable gender categories. Rather than examining the way
that white supremacist, capitalist patriarchy has structured a society
where women are child-rearers and labor markets are sex and race segregated such that poor women of color with children are disproportionately
poor, a transgender standpoint might examine how the processes of binary gender constraints (in medicine, psychology, and law) serve to
pathologize transgender expression (such that gender transgender indi-

35.

CALIF[A, supra note 28, at 9.

36. See generally WILCHINS, supra note 28.
37. Robin Wilson, TransgenderedScholars Defy Convention, Seeking To Be Heard and Seen
in Academe, THE CHRONICLE OF HIGHER EDUCATION, Feb. 6, 1998, at A 10.
38. See generally FEINBERG, supra note 28; Sandy Stone, The Empire Strikes Back: A
PosttranssexualManifest, in BODY GUARDS: THE CULTURAL POLITICS OF GENDER AMBIGUITY 280
(Julia Epstein & Kristina Straub eds., 1991); WILCHINS, supra note 28.
39. My research sought to understand the emergence of "transgender" activism in the mid1990s. The research took the form of a postmodern ethnography including a comparative case study
of 45 TG organizations, unobtrusive observation of TG Internet Newsgroups and World Wide Web
Pages, and field work in one TG community and four TG conferences. See generally K. L. Broad,
Fracturing "Transgender": Intersectional Claims and Identization, in ADVANCES IN GENDER
RESEARCH 6 (Patricia Gagne and Richard Tewksbury eds. 2002); K.L. Broad, Is it GLB and T?
Gender/Sexualtiiy Movements and Transgender Collective Identity (De)Constructions 7
INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF SEXUALITY AND GENDER STUDIES (2002).
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viduals disproportionately end up under medical supervision or in the
criminal justice system) and marginalize transgender people from gendered social structures (e.g., sex-segregated jobs and marriage, etc.) and
services (e.g., welfare and child support). A transgender standpoint
might highlight how stepping outside the bounds of presumed stable
gender categories can result in poverty (e.g., male-to-female transgender
prostitutes who do sex work because access to "traditional" sexsegregated work is blocked). Ki Namaste reminds us of the potential of
critical theory that takes lived transgender experience seriously.
[Ciritics in queer theory write page after page on the inherent liberation in the transgression of gender codes, but they have nothing to say
about the precarious position of the transsexual woman who is battered, and who is unable to access a women's shelter because she was
not born a biological woman.40
At heart, Namaste reminds us that a transgender standpoint offers a
means by which to better understand how battering is experienced and,
as I have explored here, poverty reproduced.
Yet, I am not suggesting that simply adding a transgender standpoint and stirring will give us more complete knowledge about the feminization of poverty. Important to the understanding of a transgender
lived experience expressed by transgender activists is the way it has been
complicated. In my research, throughout the process of constructing a
collective identity in the TG movement, I observed "voices of difference" (TG of color, poor TG, and gay, lesbian, and bisexual TG) challenging a universal "transgender" experience. Like the voices of difference that complicated identity politics, TG voices of difference similarly
contest a construction of a universal, politicized identity-a single transgender standpoint. In other words, by articulating the way in which
transgender experience intersects with race, class and sexuality, these
voices of difference complicate the construction of a collective identity.
Namely, those on the periphery of the movement insist that transgender
identity is not a universal experience but rather one characterized as multiple and fractured. 4' According to scholarship, "the surfacing of voices
of difference within movements [is] pivotal in facilitating the deconstruction of essentialized identities and advocating a radical cultural politics
of difference."42 In other words, the transgender voices of difference
challenge a universal transgender standpoint, reminding us that, at best,

40. Ki Namaste, "Tragic Misreadings":Queer Theory's Erasure of TransgenderSubjectivity,
in QUEER STUDIES: A LESBIAN, GAY, BISEXUAL & TRANSGENDER ANTHOLOGY 183, 198 (Brett
Beemyn & Mickey Eliason eds., 1996).
41. See generally Broad, supra note 39.
42.

SOCIAL POSTMODERNISM: BEYOND IDENTITY POLITICS 34 (Linda Nicholson & Steven

Seidman eds., 1995).
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we have standpoints situated in particular historical, socio-political moments and lived experiences.
Placing a transgender standpoint in the foreground might expand
our understanding of poverty, but it must not be at the cost of also understanding race and class as parts of a situated standpoint. Transgendering
a feminization of poverty is another means by which to construct partial
truths but does not provide us with a more thorough (universal?) knowledge. If voices of difference are still in the borderlands of movements,
are not these movements still providing situated standpoints that at times
are critical and at times dominant social knowledges? I am suggesting
that the distinction between identity politics and a politics of difference is
the distinction between a movement based on one standpoint and movements emphasizing situated standpoints. As such, the challenge is to find
a way to talk from situated standpoints and partial knowledges to address
concrete manifestations of domination/subordination.
Like feminism, transgender politics can be seen as existing in tension between identity politics and a politics of difference, wherein voices
of difference in feminism de-essentialized the category "woman," and
voices of difference in transgender activism have de-essentialized the
category, "transgender." But it is important to recognize that a politics of
difference still produces only partial truths from situated standpoints, so
the question becomes how social change is possible. Are we only able to
produce our partial truths that leave us in an abyss of relativism, where
no one's truth is more legitimate than another's? Do our situated standpoints erase the potential of collective action that essentializes a standpoint and creates more subjugated knowledges in the process? I am
assuming that the pitfalls of relativism and essentializing are negotiable
through coalitional efforts to talk across intersectional situated standpoints.
IV. CRITICAL INTERSECTIONAL COALITIONS AGAINST POVERTY

"There is no hiding place. There is nowhere you
43 can go and only be
with people who are like you. It's over. Give it up.
"The overarching matrix of domination houses multiple groups,
each with varying experiences with penalty and privilege that produce
corresponding partial perspectives, situated knowledges, and,
for clearly
4
identifiably subordinate groups, subjugated knowledges."
Thus, the problem for coalition politics is not 'What do we share?' but
rather 'What might we share as we develop our identities through the

43. Bernice Johnson Reagon, Coalition Politics: Turning the Century, in RACE, CLASS, AND
GENDER 540 (Margaret L. Andersen & Patricia Hill Collins eds., 1995).
44. COLLINS, supra note 19, at 234.

1154

DENVER UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 78:4

process of coalition?' Coalition cannot be simply the strategic alignment of diverse groups over a single issue, nor can coalition mean finding the real unity behind our apparently diverse struggles. Our politics
must be informed by affinity rather than identity, not simply because
we are not all alike, but because we each embody multiple, often conflicting, identities and locations. 5
So far, I have argued that feminist sociological knowledges about
the feminization of poverty are partial and situated. Similarly, I have
argued that transgender knowledges are partial and situated, such that a
simple application of them to feminist sociological understandings of the
feminization of poverty would not create a more complete knowledge. In
making these arguments, I am implicitly illustrating the way in which the
feminist movement has become multiple feminist movements; feminism
has transitioned from a politics of identity to difference, as such not only
producing knowledge from the standpoint of women but from Black
feminist women, Latina lesbians, and other situated standpoints. I have
also illustrated the way that the nascent transgender movement is engaging in a politics of difference, dependent on and productive of multiple
and situated knowledges about what it means to be a white male-tofemale (transwoman), a queer, a Latino female-to-male (transman), or a
poor Black cross-dresser. At heart, I am asserting (as a sociologist is apt
to do) that we are at an interesting sociological moment where we are
participating in and producing politics of difference that depend on and
create partial knowledges from situated standpoints, and I am asking
whether they/we can work in affinity/coalition.
Much of my research is attempting to sort out social movement
processes as we increasingly doubt simplistic identity politics. I recognize that one of the epistemological contributions of identity politics (especially feminist identity politics) is standpoint theory--"an approach
that argues that knowledge is and should be situated in people's diverse
social locations. As such, all knowledge is affected by the social conditions under which it is produced; it is grounded in both the social location and the social biography of the observer and the observed."4 However, I also recognize "the decreasing effectiveness of an identity politics
currently associated with standpoint theory raises question of its continued relevance." 47 As such, this paper is an examination of the way in
which standpoints are situated in a politics of difference-highlighting
the continued relevance of standpoint theory in political work and also
raising the question of the viability of situated standpoints.

45. PHELAN, supra note 4, at 140.
46. Susan A. Mann & Lori R. Kelley, Standing at the Crossroads of Modernist Thought:
Collins, Smith, and the New FeministEpistemologies, 11(4) GENDER & SOC. 391, 392 (1997).
47. COLLINS, supra note 4, at 203.
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This is an important question for LatCrit because it addresses the
very concerns that this movement is built upon-concerns about intersectionality, partial and situated knowledges, construction of transformative knowledges and coalitional politics. Further, it is an important question for all movements (e.g., feminist and transgender), negotiating the
tension between politics of identity and difference. I am not asserting that
we must sort through these epistemological questions of how to combine
situated standpoints in construction of postmodern knowledges in order
to enact a better politics of difference. Following Seidman's assertion
that "postmodern social ideas emerged, at least in part, out of the development of the new social movements," ' I feel that this epistemological
question arises from the very type of political activity we are witnessing
currently. In other words, I feel this is an important question epistemologically and politically, and offers us a means by which to see how our
ways of knowing and our politics are related and interconnected-a
seemingly vital question for academic activists.
Importantly, I also see this as an important question because I see
epistemological and political value in standpoint theory and want to assert it is important to continue theorizing it. The assumption that "one's
everyday life has epistemological consequences and implications--the
disadvantaged have the potential to be more knowledgeable, in a way,
than the dominant group" is an important means by which we can create
and legitimate knowledge-from the borderlands. 5° Furthermore, if both
sociology and law are central in constructing, and complicit in upholding, matrixes of domination (as I have assumed in this paper), standpoint
theory is a politically and epistemologically vital means by which to create oppositional knowledges. Taking Patricia Hill Collins' warning that
standpoint theory (in her example of Black Feminist Thought) can be
both dominant and critical social theory,5 I still feel that the links between experience and knowledge and the centrality of political struggle
in order to achieve a standpoint offers important potential to create oppositional knowledges in the context of difference politics.
The question this paper has been entertaining is whether situated
standpoints can address the same social problem, and if so how. In considering this question, it is important to mention some challenges facing
standpoint theory in an era of difference. One criticism of standpoint
theory has been the problem with relativism-if we assert that the
knowledge is partial and situated, we lose all standards by which to determine which knowledge is legitimate. Patricia Hill Collins discusses

48.
49.
50.
51.

SEIDMAN, supra note 4, at 204.
See generally COLLINS, supra note 4.
See generally id.; ANZAILDOiA, supra note 26.
See COIUNS, supra note 4.
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this as the myth of equivalent oppressions.52 She discusses the necessity
of understanding that assertions that standpoints are partial and situated
are not assertions that all oppressions are equivalent. To do so, she begins to explore how standpoints are differently situated by comparing the
social, structural components of race-class standpoints to gender standpoints:
Black women and White women do not live in class-stratified
women's neighborhoods, separated from men and children by processes such as gender steering, bank redlining that results in refusal to
lend money to women's neighborhoods, inferior schools in women's
inner-city neighborhoods due to men moving to all-male suburban areas, and the like.53
She notes that a key challenge for standpoint theory is to ensure that
"neither froup practices nor any ensuing standpoints replicate other hierarchies." In this paper, I have explored the means by which some feminist standpoints and some transgender standpoints potentially replicate
hierarchies. The key is that I read feminist and transgender movements
and theories as self-reflective and cognizant of their partiality, such that
through coalition they might be able to become more critical than dominant knowledges.
Another challenge of standpoint theory in a politics of difference is
the very challenge of difference itself.55 The concern is that by recognizing the way in which identities intersect and oppressions are interlocking,
we will lose a means by which to form collective identities and therefore
participate in collective action. In the worst case scenario, the idea is
that a recognition of intersectionality will be reduced to individualism
and, thus, leave us without political viability and theoretical cohesiveness. On the other hand, the concern is that in striving for any sort of
group-derived standpoint, we risk essentializing group identities. Both
of these challenges can be seen in concrete terms by considering the
topic of this paper. If we recognize the multiple feminist standpoints that
theorize different understandings of the "feminization of poverty" and
also genuinely hear the "voices of difference" in transgender activism, is
there any means by which to enact collective action? Further, if we speak
of this problem as reducible to two situated standpoints (feminist and
transgender) are we in some way essentializing groups? I would suggest
that coalitional/alliance strategies are one means by which to strategically "essentialize" group formation and standpoints, such that political
work is possible but the fluidity of intersectional, transgressive identities
are kept present.
52.
53.
54.
55.

Id. at 208.
Id. at 219.
Id. at 219.
Id. at 205.
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It seems, at this point in the paper, that my logical conclusion would
be to suggest strategic alignment of diverse groups (feminist and transgender) over a single issue, feminization of poverty. However, this will
not be my suggestion. Were I to recommend this strategy, I would be
recommending implicit categorization of two distinct groups, thereby
erasing the multiple and often conflicting identities within feminism and
transgender activism. Furthermore, recommending coalition around one
issue, in this case "feminization of poverty" would be recommending a
privileging of that particular issue--establishing a hierarchy of oppressions reminiscent of previous battles in identity politics. Rather, I think
it important to think of coalitional efforts as much more fluid and
changeable. In other words, the means by which I recommend coalition
is a means by which we can make a move from identity politics to a politics of difference. Another strategy that might seem a logical conclusion
would be to recommend finding the commonalties between the situated
standpoints of feminists who recognize the intersections of race, class,
and gender in studying the feminization of poverty and of transgender
activists who see the need to link understandings of race and class and
sexuality to the malleability of gender. However, that is not going to be
my strategy. Rather, I follow Collins by suggesting that the important
tactic is to form coalition, to "do coalition," in order to see what we
"might" share. One of the more interesting things I have learned in
studying new social movements is that people do not begin with an identity and then join collective action, but they come to have and construct
that very identity through collective action. I think we can use a similar
logic in terms of coalitional politics of difference, where as Shane Phelan
explains, "identities will change as a result of our politics." To begin by
naming the similarities between situated standpoints as the ground by
which to build coalition would be to assume we must have similar "interests" in order to proceed. To do so would be to essentialize those standpoints in some sense-where would a transgender feminist of color
stand? What would his or her standpoint be? To highlight the similarities
in standpoints as the reason for coalition is to fall back on strategies of
identity politics where we assume stability and naturalness of group identity. Instead, I want to suggest that we envision coalition in the way that
Phelan does when she says we must strive for alliances beyond identity,
for a "deesentialized identity politics, 5 7 where we use strategies of "migration," as Collins describes. "Embracing migration and movement can
also spur some important coalitions among individuals of all sorts who
move into and through outsider-within locations. . . . Outsider-within
locations allow individuals from these diverse places to meet and compare notes." Collins's vision of "outsider-within" locations is to "no

56.
57.
58.

PHELAN, supra note 4, at 149.
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COLLINS, supra note 4, at 234.
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longer belong to any one group." 9 She views migration and movement as
a call to breach boundaries, consciously and purposely, in order to develop critical social theory.60 I think what she is suggesting is that our
situated standpoints, our differently-situated outsider-within locations,
now (in a politics of difference) depend on intersectional coalitions. It is
from the critical borderlands of outsider-within coalitions that we find
what we share and locate allies.
Rather than identifying the things we hold in common as the means
by which to form coalitions, postmodem political theorists Phelan and
Collins suggest that we "migrate" into coalition to find what we "might
share.' Collins summarizes the process: "Individuals who manage to
migrate from these subordinated groups often find that they share common themes, interpretive paradigms, and epistemological orientations." 62
As a hopeful note, I will close by briefly mentioning one potential
common theme and epistemological orientation I think we might share
between feminism and transgender activism. First, as this paper has illustrated, the situated standpoints of feminists of color hold the intersections
of race, class, and gender as central to explaining the feminization of
poverty. Similarly, transgender activists centralize difference and the
fluidity of identity through activism centered on destabilizing gender.
Yet, the fluidity implied by intersectionality and by deconstructive resistance to gender categories are distinct. Coalitional theorizing between
intersectional and "queer" situated standpoints might show shared points
of "difference" and also highlight the specificities of each.
In the end, I am assuming that "silencing anyone won't make any of
this go away." ' In other words, as we strive to define a politics of difference that puts the intersections of race/class/gender/sexuality at center,
seeks to de-essentialize categories of identity/oppression, and (re)define
the project as one of multiple truths and partial knowledges, I think it
important to once again examine the way in which we construct knowledges, reproduce silences, and resist domination. In this paper, I have
argued that (politically) intersectional coalitions, and (theoretically) critical borderlands, are strategies of a politics of difference, intersections,
partial truths, and transformative knowledges.
59. Id. at 5. A concrete example might be the way that I transgress gender and also exist as a
feminist. Given the contentious history between some forms of radical feminisms and some
transgender activists, my "position" is an outsider within. I have all sorts of feminist credentials
(e.g., a job in Women's Studies), yet my involvement with transgender activism also marks me as an
outsider. Similarly, I have all sorts of credentials to "fit" in transgender groups, but my position
teaching both Women's Studies and Lesbian/Gay Studies marks me as an outsider. And yet, I travel
between and within these worlds.
60. Id. at 231.
61.
See generally PHELAN,supra note 4; COLLINS, supra note 4.
62. COLLINS, supra note 4, at 234.
63.
Id. at94.
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CONCLUSION

And so, I would like to end by answering my own questions. I began by asking, "why do we not speak of transgender people of color or
queer Latina/os when we address the "feminization of poverty?" I answered it by asserting that even in a politics of difference, we still have
silences because critical theory can also act as dominant theory. I also
asked "How is it that the "feminization of poverty has become understood as an example of 'female' subordination curiously distinct from
racialized and (not or) sexualized subordination?" My argument is that
both sociology and law are complicit in constructing white supremacist,
capitalist, patriarchal, gender binary, heteronormative knowledges-partially dominant standpoints about the "feminizations" of poverty. I began by asking "How might we attend to these subjugated
knowledges from our own locations within a matrix of domination?" I
also asked "how do we participate in anti-subordination efforts across
our multiple intersections?" I answered these questions by suggesting
that we can speak from a situated standpoint to produce oppositional
knowledge(s), but it is not, and need not be, an essentialized position.
Further, I suggested that coalition between situated standpoints is one
means by which to construct knowledges and strategize politically, but it
must not be coalition formed around a single issue or in terms of essentialized group interests. I close with the suggestion that (politically) intersectional coalitions and (epistemologically) critical borderlands are a
means by which we can unearth silenced knowledges, create transformative ones, and continue a critical politics of difference.

